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This paper confronts the wide political support for the 
2C objective of global increase in temperature, reaffirmed 
in Copenhagen, with the consistent set of hypotheses 
on which it relies. It explains why neither an almost zero 
pure time preference nor concerns about catastrophic 
damages in case of uncontrolled global warming are 
prerequisites for policy decisions preserving the possibility 
of meeting a 2C target. It rests on an optimal stochastic 
control model balancing the costs and benefits of climate 
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policies resolved sequentially in order to account for the 
arrival of new information (the RESPONSE model). 
This model describes the optimal abatement pathways for 
2,304 worldviews, combining hypotheses about growth 
rates, baseline emissions, abatement costs, pure time 
preference, damages, and climate sensitivity. It shows 
that 26 percent of the worldviews selecting the 2C target 
are not characterized by one of the extreme assumptions 
about pure time preference or climate change damages.Do we need a zero pure time preference or
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11 Introduction
One of the intriguing results of the Cop 15 (Copenhagen climate change con-
ference 2009) is the apparent contradiction between the absence of a ﬁrm
commitment on country or regional targets and the conﬁrmed 2
°C objective,
i.e. the stabilization of global warming below a 2
°C rise in global temper-
ature. Obviously, this target is surrounded by ambiguity about whether it
is a strict ceiling or a long term objective with some degree of overshooting
allowed in between. The reference to that threshold originates in a visual
reﬂex, a 550 ppm target ﬁtting just in the middle of the IPCC SAR ﬁgure
displaying various scenarios between 350 ppm and 1000ppm. This target was
also supported by the intuition that it would not lead to extreme mitigation
costs, given published results from economic models of the time.
This 550 ppm target was supposed to be tight enough to keep temperature
increase below two degrees above pre-industrial temperatures. But, some
years later, the assessments of climate sensitivity became more pessimistic
and it seems unlikely that a 550 ppm target will secure a 2
°C objective and
the delay in mitigation actions after the semi failure of international climate
negotiations since the Kyoto Protocol makes it far more diﬃcult to reach
signiﬁcantly tighter targets like 380 ppm.
But, the gap is obvious between, on the one hand, this political claim
and, on the other hand, the published economic literature that relies on a
cost-beneﬁt analysis of climate policies (Tol, Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, etc.) or
even the Stern report that pleads in favor of early action but does not appear
to support ﬁrmly the 2
°C objective.
The overwhelming majority of tenants of the 2
°C target can be found in
scientiﬁc and intellectual circles that reject the very idea of CBA in these
matters. Some start from an ethical rejection of a full monetization of cli-
mate change damage (value of life, intrinsic value of irreplaceable assets), but
many simply question the credibility of such estimates given the cascade of
uncertainty between GHGs emissions and ultimate damage. In both cases,
they prefer to refer to the search for “safe corridors” normatively ﬁxed from
qualitative insights provided by integrated models.
In a companion paper (Hallegatte et al., 2009), we analyze the many rea-
sons why, beyond a 2
°C temeprature increase, the uncertainty may become
so high that it would generate very high adaptation costs and signiﬁcant
residual damage. With a temperature increase higher than 2
°C, the climate
system enters in a domain where the validation of climate models becomes
less reliable, making their projections more uncertain. Also, the ecosystem
reaction is not well understood for large warming. Finally, the diﬃculty in
mobilizing the full capacity of adaptation potentials in case of very fast envi-
2ronmental change, the risks of mis-adaptation, the inertia of capital stocks,
and many sources of ripple eﬀect within the economic system make the full
cost of a rapid climate change very uncertain.
This enumeration delivers a puzzling message: on one hand it gives a set
of reasons why climate change damage may be high enough to economically
justify the 2
°C ceiling; on the other hand it explains that, given the uncer-
tainty and the current state of scientiﬁc knowledge, no fully-ﬂedged monetary
assessment of damage can be conducted.
But the nagging economic question remains which implies to carry out
some form of cost-beneﬁt trade-oﬀ: a dollar, euro, yen or yuan spent for
climate mitigation will not be spent elsewhere. The only way out (Manne
and Richels, 1995; IPCC, 1996) is to reframe the cost-beneﬁt analysis in the
context of a sequential decision-making process with progressive learning and
continuous reorientation of the initial course of action. Also, in the absence
of robust monetary assessment of damage, a solution is to give monetary
values to possible risks, through the introduction of a willingness to pay for
avoiding poorly understood but potentially serious risks.
Note that this approach does not contradict the tenants of a cost-eﬃciency
approach. Indeed the trade-oﬀ between costs and beneﬁts of action still exists
but is implicit. Essentially, the only diﬀerence between a cost-beneﬁt analysis
and a cost-eﬃciency analysis is the fact that overshooting is prohibited in
the latter (as if the willingness to pay would reach inﬁnity just after another
marginal increase in emissions), while it is allowed in the former.
This type of approach (Ha-Duong et al., 1997; Ambrosi et al., 2003) tries
and balances the sunk costs due to a premature high level of action against
the environmental risks of a delay in action. The main lesson from this
approach is the importance of the asymmetry between these two costs: the
cost of loosening the carbon constraint in view of new and more optimistic
information is relatively lower than the very high costs of either supporting
the environmental irreversibility eﬀect or accelerating mitigation policies that
would have been too lax in a ﬁrst stage.
Actually the issue is that there are as many cost-beneﬁt balances as opin-
ions about the future of the world economy and the risks triggered by global
warming. These worldviews are composed of :
ˆ conjectures about baseline economic growth and related GHG emis-
sions;
ˆ assessments of costs of carbon saving technologies;
ˆ choice of the pure time preference which translates consumption ﬂows
3into utility ﬂows, and balance the utility of present and future genera-
tions;
ˆ beliefs on climate change damage, which in turn consist in beliefs about
climate, about the ultimate level of damage, and about the shape of
the damage function;
ˆ sets of priors about probability distribution on the uncertain parame-
ters.
We start from the idea that there is no scientiﬁc reason to close pre-
maturely these divergences in views, some incorporating real scientiﬁc and
ethical controversies. We consider it more useful to produce a set of numer-
ical experiments on all these worldviews to elicit for which of them a 2
°C
objective would be economically sound.
We will do so through a stochastic optimal control model, the RESPONSE
model. This model balances discounted costs and beneﬁts of climate policies
and calculates optimal response pathways (see a full description in Ambrosi
et al. (2003) and in the appendix).
Using this model, we ﬁnd that there are as many optimal emissions path-
ways and associated carbon prices as there are combinations of worldviews
and assumptions. This multiplicity simply translates the current diversity of
opinions. The advantage of a stochastic optimal control framework is that it
captures a situation in which each club of opinion (corresponding to a speciﬁc
combination of worldviews) admits (i) that there are other possible opinions
on climate change; and (ii) that its own anticipation of climate change may
be proven wrong after a given date. Each club attaches priors to damage
assessments, even for others than its own“best guess,”and it tries to always
be in position to bifurcate to other targets if new information shows it to be
necessary.
We can thus identify the combinations of worldviews that make a 2
°C
target economically sound, without resorting to arbitrary normative targets.
We can then analyze the main characteristic of these combinations, in order
to identify the parameters that are conducive for action. More precisely the
issue is whether a 2
°C objective can be justiﬁed without resorting to a very
low pure time preference, like the Stern’s exercise, or to the expectation of
a possible global catastrophe, like in the Weitzman’s exercise. On a more
policy oriented approach, identifying the set of hypothesis and beliefs that
are consistent with the 2
°C target may be useful in future climate negotiation
to discriminate between political claims and credible commitment to reach
that target.
42 The model: A process of optimization
under uncertainty
RESPONSE is an Integrated Assessment Model (IAM), which couples a
macroeconomic optimal growth model1 following the tradition launched by
the seminal DICE model by Nordhaus (Nordhaus, 1994), with a simple cli-
matic model. Here we present its basic equations, derived from the model
used in Ambrosi et al. (2003).
The program maximizes an intertemporal social welfare function under
uncertainty. Uncertainty holds on both climate sensitivity (and on tempera-
ture increase θ
s,j
t,at) and damage denoted Dj. To encompass the whole range
of beliefs on the true climate damage, the model considers ﬁve states of the
nature s for climate sensitivity (θs
2x in table 2) and ﬁve states j (Zj in table 2)
for the form of damage. As climate change is basically a non-reproducible
event, a subjective distribution of probabilities (ps and qj) is given to each
state of the world (presented in table 2). These probabilities can be in-
terpreted as the level of conﬁdence a stakeholder attaches to each existing
climate scenarios and to each assessment of climate change impacts.
The uncertainty actually operates at ﬁrst period, before a point in time
denoted tinfo at which uncertainty is resolved about the genuine level of
climate change damage and on the climate sensitivity. Some argue that
the “climate proof” was already provided by the two last IPCC reports, the
Stern Review and the long serie of climate catastrophes over the past decade.
What is meant by resolution of uncertainty is that all forms of controversies
are stopped, and that there is a wide consensus on the validity of information.
In the forthcoming simulations the date tinfo is set at 2050. At the end of
this learning and self-convincing process, people adapt their initial behavior
to new information, they accelerate abatements in case of “bad news” and
relax the eﬀort in case of “good news”.
We note S = (5,5) the number of states for s and j. The intertemporal
social utility function to maximize between now and the ultimate period T















with u(.) the utility function, Nt the population at t which is assumed to
grow at an exogenous rate, and C
s,j
t the consumption of a composite good at
1very like Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans’ models (Ramsey, 1928; Koopmans, 1965; Cass,
1966)
5t in the states of the world s and j. The individual discount factor Γ may be
written as 1
1+ρ, with ρ the pure time preference.

























t stands for the capital at t which is set at the level Kt what-
ever the states of the world are, when t ≤ tinfo. δ is the parameter
of capital depreciation. Lt is an exogeneous factor of labor which en-
ters Y (.), the traditional Cobb-Douglass function of production. Since
technical inertia is a key determinant of the problem, we follow the

































t the fraction of emissions’ cuttings2. The cost function has





ν a variable power coeﬃcient, and a path dependent function which




t−1) so that it costs 1%
of annual GDP to totally decarbonize the economy in 50 years, whereas
it costs 25% of annual GDP if total abatement is achieved within 10
years. Then, PTt is a parameter of exogenous technical progress, BK
stands for the current price of backstop technology, ζ and ξ are ﬁxed
parameters, and E
s,j
t represents the level of emissions. Emissions are
considered here as a fatal product and can be written as:
E
s,j
t = σtY (K
s,j
t ,Lt),
with σt the carbon intensity of production which declines progressively





t ) denotes damage induced by θ
s,j
t,at, the temperature
increase due to GHG emissions from preindustrial period to the date
2If a
s,j
t = 1, then emissions become nul; on the contrary, if a
s,j
t = 0, then no eﬀort of
abatement is provided
6t. Rather than traditional power functions, we use sigmoidal functions
(Ambrosi et al., 2003) to represent non linearity eﬀects in damage (see
the appendix for the mathematical formulation of the function). Within
capital dynamics, damages amputate a part of the production which











This equation links temperature increase at time t to past carbon emis-
sions ﬂows Et, Et−1 up to E0
3. This function incorporates the lin-
ear three-reservoir model of carbon cycle by Nordhaus (Nordhaus and
Boyer, 1999) and a temperature model very close to Schneider and
Thompson’s two-box model (Schneider and Thompson, 1981) (see the
appendix for a detailed presentation of carbon and temperature dy-
namics).
3 Worldviews and scenarios
Each scenario is based upon a set of beliefs on six key and controversial
parameters: economic growth, the speed of the autonomous decarbonization
of the production system, technical costs of GHG emissions’ cuts, the weight
given to future generations, the magnitude of climate damage and ﬁnally the
index of climate sensitivity.
To span the array of scientiﬁc opinions, we retained 9 combinations for
the climate damage and the climate sensitivity (see table 2). For the eco-
nomic and technological parameters, the extreme values given by the last
IPCC report are considered (IPCC, 2007b,a) (see table 1)4, and four values
uniformly distributed within these bounds are used to cover the range of
scientiﬁc uncertainty.
3.1 Economic and technological parameters
In the baseline scenario (i.e. when climate change is not considered), economic
growth is, on average over the whole twenty-ﬁrst century, in the range [1.45%,
3Notice that before tinfo, as abatement is set whatever the states of the world are,
emissions ﬂows are also set
4Note that, regarding abatement costs, the critic of Pielke et al. (2008) et al in Nature
concerns the ﬁgures published in the synthesis report. We retained here the ”primary
material” of the report that includes both optimistic and pessimistic cost assumptions
7Sensitive variables Parameters of the
model




Emissions Parameter of decar-
bonization ψ0
0.5%/year 1.5%/year
Abatement costs BK2008, ν, ζ, α 110$/t CO2, 3, 0,
1%







Table 1: Value ranges for the socio-economic scenarios
3%], with higher growth rates over the decades. Its impact on the volume of
carbon emissions is determined by the carbon intensity σt which in turn is
driven by ψt which captures the joint impact of technical change and fossil
resources depletion: σt = σ0e−ψtt with ψt > 0. For a given population level,
carbon emissions level is proportional to E0e(g−ψt)t. As long as g > ψt (with
ψt set at its initial level), carbon emissions would remain strictly growing
with time for most (ψ0, g) couples. To guarantee that emissions decrease by
the end of the century, as predicted by the overwhelming majority of available
scenarios, ψt progressively increases so that it can become higher than g:
ψt = ψ0e
βt + 1.1g(1 − e
βt),
with β > 0, the speed of growth of ψt. Thus,
σt = σ0e
(ψ0e−βt+1.1g(1−e−βt))t.
Beliefs about mitigation costs are captured through the price of the back-
stop carbon free technology BK2008 capable to achieve total abatement of
CO2 emissions. This technology is supposed to be available at each time
period, with a cost declining over time, but it penetrates only when it be-
comes cost-eﬃcient at a rate function of the rate of capital turnover. Costs
of backstops are not explicitly mentioned by the last IPCC report but can be
determined in order to ﬁt with its published cost data (Figure 3.25 page 205).
We retained an initial range of [110$/tCO2, 1023$/tCO2] and decreases at a
rate of 1% and 1.35% for optimistic and pessimistic opinions respectively.
As regards to pure time preference ρ, it is not the place to close the dis-
pute between the advocates of normative choice of that parameter and the
advocates of a positive approach consistent with observed behaviors and viru-
lent ethical controversies rooted in old intellectual traditions (Ramsey (1928)
8Types of beliefs Optimistic Moderate Pessimistic
Temperature thresh-
olds of damage trig-
gering (in
°C)
Z1 = 2, Z2 = 2.5, Z3 = 3, Z4 = 3.5, Z5 = 4
Distributions of
probabilities
q1 = 0.02 q1 = 0.1 q1 = 0.55
q2 = 0.03 q2 = 0.25 q2 = 0.3
q3 = 0.1 q3 = 0.3 q3 = 0.1
q4 = 0.3 q4 = 0.25 q4 = 0.03
q5 = 0.55 q5 = 0.1 q5 = 0.02
Expected damage for
2
°C increase of mean
temperatures
0.8% of GDP 2% of GDP 3.2% of GDP




2x = 1.5, θ2
2x = 2.3, θ3
2x = 3, θ4




p1 = 0.55 p1 = 0.1 p1 = 0.02
p2 = 0.3 p2 = 0.25 p2 = 0.03
p3 = 0.1 p3 = 0.3 p3 = 0.1
p4 = 0.03 p4 = 0.25 p4 = 0.3
p5 = 0.02 p5 = 0.1 p5 = 0.55
Expected beliefs on






Table 2: Table of all scenarios of potential damage
vs Koopmans et al. (1964)). This is why we retained, as two extreme values
of ρ = 0.1 as recommended by N. Stern (Stern, 2006) and 2% (Weitzman,
2007b).
The combination of values in table 1 gives 44 = 256 scenarios.
3.2 Climate change damage
Table 2 show the values retained for climate sensitivity and the threshold
of temperature increase which triggers non linear damage. We consider ﬁve






and damage are described through a hybrid linear-sigmoidal function rather
than a power function to capture the possible emergence of non linear damage
(Ambrosi et al., 2003). We consider 5 possible levels of thresholds of temper-





°C), beyond which catastrophic
9events, in the Weitzman’s sense (Weitzman, 2007a) cannot be excluded. No-
tice that the overshooting of those thresholds does not suddenly triggers its
total eﬀect (6% of GDP loss); damage spread out progressively over a tem-
perature range η which corresponds to an arbitrary additional 0.6
°C (for
instance, over the range [1.7
°C, 2.3
°C] for the lowest possible threshold).
For each parameter, three opinions are represented, each of them deﬁned
by a speciﬁc distribution of probabilities on the diﬀerent possible values of the
two uncertain parameters. Optimistic (or, pessimistic) belief on the threshold
is consistent with a probability distribution which put a great weight to the
highest (respectively, the lowest) value of the threshold (4
°C or respectively,
2
°C) and a declining weight to other levels of the threshold. In the same way,
optimistic (or, pessimistic) beliefs on climate sensitivity are translated by a
probability distribution which put a great weight to its lowest (respectively,
its highest) value (1.5
°C or respectively, 4.5
°C).
Combining the numerical assumptions displayed in table 2 gives 32 = 9
climate damage scenarios. Eventually, combining them with the 256 eco-
nomic scenarios gives 2,304 integrated scenarios which cover the whole range
of logically possible opinions in the climatic debate.
4 Worldviews and sets of economic rationale
for a 2
°C target
Simulations show that launching in 2010 GHG abatement policies aiming at
a 2
°C target5, and securing the capacity to redirect the emissions trajectory
in 2040, appears economically sound to 783 out of 2,304 worldviews.
This section will investigate the population that sees a 2
°C target as a
rational economic choice, to understand what are the beliefs that are consis-
tent with a 2
°C target and see if a 2
°C target is only consistent with a very
low pure time preference (like in the Stern report) or with the possibility of
a catastrophic climate change (like in Weitzman’s exercise).
There are many reasons that explain why a given combination of param-
eters results in a pro or anti 2
°C choice (GDP growth, decoupling between
baseline emissions and GDP, GHGs abatement costs). Table 3 focuses on
two parameters because of their importance in policy debates: the pure time
preference (PTP) and the assumption about the shape of the damage curve
(existence of several thresholds).
5This choice does not guarantee that the 2
°C target will be met at all point in time for
all these 783 combinations. In such a cost-beneﬁt framework, indeed, the optimal trade-oﬀ
may allow for transitory overshoots (the 2
°C target is met in all cases in 2200, but the
temperature can exceed this value over the entire trajectory).
10Impact of crossing the threshold 0.1078 0.3776 0.7679
PTP
0.10 96 116 142
0.73 40 62 95
1.37 19 45 75
2.00 8 29 56
Table 3: Number of worldviews supporting a 2
°C target as a function of PTP
and of possible damage thresholds. This table shows the relative inﬂuence of
the pure time preference and of the beliefs about the shape of the damage
curve (i.e. the share of damage due to the crossing of uncertain thresholds
relative to the total damage).
Impact of crossing the threshold 0.1078 0.3776 0.7679
PTP
0.10 48 68 94
0.73 7 22 49
1.37 3 14 36
2.00 1 6 21
Table 4: Number of worldviews supporting a 2
°C target, after removal of the
most optimistic mitigation costs hypothesis.
Unsurprinsingly the major part of the pro-2
°C (54%) have a Stern-type
of pure time preference (Table 3). But this ethical choice does not appear
as a pre-condition for a very ambitious action since a signiﬁcant number of
combinations (93) with a high 2% PTP result into a pro-2
°C choice. Clearly
most of them (60%) share the idea of strongly non linear damage curves and
there are seven times more chances to ﬁnd a pro-2
°C attitude in this category
of worldviews that amongst those who believe that the damage curve is linear.
But one can argue that these ﬁgures are biased by the fact that some
of the combination lead to overwhelmingly optimistic visions of abatement
costs (be for reasons of high decoupling in the baseline or because of very
low costs of carbon free technologies or thanks to any combination of this
type of hypothesis). Table 4 then reports the same type of information after
exclusion of those “technological panglossians”.
The ﬁrst striking result is that there is a threshold in the eﬀect of the PTP:
for the combination in which people attribute a low importance to non-linear
damage curves (with a share of non-linear damage of 0.1078). In that case
indeed only 18% have a PTP higher than 0.1% (a single one conﬁguration for
a 2% PTP). This is clearly due to the fact that, with a linear damage curve,
11high damage occur very late, making the role of the discount rate critical in
a cost-beneﬁt analysis.
The second result is that, even after exclusion of the overly optimists
about abatement costs a 2
°C objective is still economically sound for a sig-
niﬁcant number of combinations with medium to high PTP (47%). This is
due to a mechanism that does not appear with a linear cost-curve: with a
threshold, the most pessimistic hypothesis about climate variability make
these thresholds to appear sooner, triggering damage which grow faster and
thus outweight, during a period, the eﬀect of discounting.
In the club of those who believe in linear damage curve, there is 48 times
more people who have a very low PTP than a 2% one; this ratio is only 4.5
for those who believe in strongly non linear damage.
If we now exclude the combinations that could be suspected of being
biased in favor of action (very low PTP and very low mitigation cost) the
number of pro-2
°C worldviews is 159 amongst which two-thirds anticipate
high non linearity in damage curves and 26.4% a medium non linearity. This
remaining group is critical because it contains the sensitive (and perhaps
majority) groups of opinions which are neither extremely optimistic about
mitigation costs nor ready to sacriﬁce too much their welfare to the welfare
of their descendants.
5 Conclusion
Coming back to the initial question about the 2
°C objective and the am-
biguity of its interpretation, we have ﬁrst to underline that the 2
°C value
is here purely illustrative. Those who think that it is allready too late to
avoid a huge overshoot of this ceiling could argue that 2.5 or 3
°C could have
been more relevant. However, this does not invalidate the three following
conclusions:
1. Extremely low discount rates or overly optimistic views about mitiga-
tion costs are not a precondition for ambitious action;
2. This statement holds even in the absence of catastrophic climate change
in the Weitzmann sense;
3. The shape of the damage curve matters as much as the absolute level
of action in the cost-beneﬁt balance of climate policies (Dumas and
Ha-Duong, 2008).
Beyond, if we now assume a delay in action, two mechanisms enter into
play: ﬁrst, the number of pro-2
°C worldviews (panglossians and almost zero
12PTP excluded) falls by 44% for a 20 years delay; second, the number and
magnitude of the overshooting increases. But the number of the believers in
the linearity of damage decreases far less; again this is due to the fact that
for them, damage occurs very late even in the case of a large delay in acting.
Appendix
A The model
We built an IAM which couples a macroeconomic optimal growth model with
a climatic one. Here we present the very basic equations of the model and
the main analytical results.
















under four constraints: ∀s and ∀j,




































































with the following equation of emissions (before abatement):
E
s,j
t = σtY (K
s,j
t ,Lt);
ˆ carbon dynamics as a three-reservoir linear carbon-cycle model: We
use the C-Cycle of Nordhaus (Nordhaus and Boyer, 1999), a linear
three-reservoir model (atmosphere, biosphere + surface ocean and deep
ocean). Each reservoir is assumed to be homogeneous (well mixed in
13the short run) and is characterized by a residence time inside the box
and corresponding mixing rates with the two other reservoirs (longer
timescales). Carbon ﬂows between reservoirs depend on constant trans-
fert coeﬃcients. GHGs emissions (CO2 solely) accumulate in the atmo-
sphere and they are slowly removed by biospheric and oceanic sinks.

































t represents the carbon contents of atmosphere at time t, B
s,j
t ,
the contents of upper ocean and biosphere at time t, O
s,j
t , the carbon
contents of deep ocean at time t. Notice that before tinfo, carbon
contents of each reservoir are set and written as follows At, Bt, Ot.
Ctrans is the net transfer coeﬃcients matrix and v is a column vector
(1,0,0). Nordhaus calibration on existing carbon-cycle models gives the
















The main criticism which may be address to this C-cycle model is that
the transfer coeﬃcients are constant. In particular, they do not depend
on the carbon contentof the reservoir (e.g. deforestation hindering bio-
spheric sinks (Gitz and Ciais, 2003)) nor are they inﬂuenced by ongoing
climatic change (e.g. positive feedbacks between climate change and
carbon cycle).
ˆ temperatures dynamics as a reduced-form climate model: This model
is very close to Schneider and Thompson’s two-box model (Schneider
and Thompson, 1981). A set of two equations is used to describe global
mean temperature variation (3) since pre-industrial times in response
to additional human-induced forcing (2). More precisely, the model de-
scribes the modiﬁcation of the thermal equilibrium between atmosphere
and surface ocean in response to anthropogenic greenhouse eﬀect.
The radiative forcing equation is given by:
Ft(A
s,j






14where Ft is the radiative forcing at time t (W.m−2), F2x, the instan-
taneous radiative forcing for a doubling of preindustrial concentration,
set at 3.71 W.m−2 and API, the atmospheric concentration at pre-
industrial times, set at 280 ppm.






























t,oc are respectively global mean atmospheric and oceanic
temperature rises from pre-industrial times (
°C), φ
s,j











t,oc), σ1, σ2, σ3 are transfert coef-
ﬁcients, and T s
2x is the climate sensitivity.





















t . λt,at is the langrange multiplier corresponding with the
atmospheric concentrations, linked with marginal damage through a set of
equations (not shown) determining the lagrangian multipliers associated with
the dynamics of carbon cycle and temperature. E[X] is the expected value
of X over s and j. First order conditions of the centralized model lead to the
social discount rates (SDRt).
∀t ≤ ti:

































with cM, the mean cost of abatement:
cM(at,at−1) = PTt.
 











and dM, mean damage:
d
j
M(θt) = αθt +
 
d
1 + ((2 − e)/e)2(Zj−θt)/η
 
;
15At ti + 1:
















































A.1 Decentralization of the optimum
Companies’ objective

















Y (Kt,Lt) − Ca(at,at−1,Kt) − rtKt − δKt
























































t − wtLt − ω
s,j












t the optimal tax put on carbon emissions which is
identiﬁed, at the optimum, as the SCC, and rt, the interest rate (or marginal
productivity of capital) which is determined endogenously in order to capture
the impacts of climate change.
First order conditions to recover the optimal rate of tax and so the
SCC
Numerical calculations of the SCC are based upon the following formula.
16∀t < ti + 1 we obtain:
∂πt
∂at








= 0 ⇒ rt = Y
′(Kt,Lt)(1 − (ωt(1 − at) + cM(at,at−1))σt) − δ
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